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CLASS, SOCIAL CLEAVAGE AND INDONESIAN COMMUNISM*
Rex Mortimer
Interest conflicts among social classes provide the founda­
tion upon which communist theories of revolution are constructed, 
and the strategic formulations of communist parties place heavy 
reliance upon class factors as motors of their political devel­
opment. To a greater or lesser degree, however, specific com­
munist movements have been affected in their strategies by the 
operation of other social cleavages impinging on the political 
process. Thus in the Russian revolution, the "war or peace" 
issue was a vital element in Bolshevik calculations; in China, 
Vietnam and Yugoslavia, the national struggle played a critical 
role in shaping lines of division to some extent cross-cutting 
class loyalties. The implications of these interactions for 
the ideologies of the parties concerned is a complex study, but 
I think it is true to say at least that class issues in each 
case have always continued to occupy a prominent role.* 1 2
In the case of the Indonesian Communist Party under the 
Aidit leadership (1951-1965), on the other hand, we probably 
have the most outstanding example among major communist parties 
of a trend away from class strategy. The strategic concepts of 
the PKI were cast in terms of class theory, particularly in the 
early years after the assumption of the Aidit leadership, but 
the theory was increasingly "bent" to accommodate the influence 
of other bases of social cleavage upon the PKI’s political work. 
The fundamental reasons for this ideological shift, it will be 
argued here, are to be found in the specific features of Indo­
nesian social structure and political history and, in particular, 
the weakness of class "contradictions" in comparison with other 
bases of social conflict.
Class formation and class differentiation along a property 
line of demarcation (or, in Marxist terminology, based on opposed 
relationships to the means of production) are a relatively re­
cent development in Indonesia. In pre-colonial society, when
* Based on a working paper submitted to a Seminar of the Centre 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Australia.
1. The varying emphases in Maofs thought are discussed in many 
works, of which mention may be made of Benjamin Schwartz’ 
Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge: Harvard 
University, 1951) and Stuart Schramm’s Mao Tse-tung (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1966).
2. The following passages on pre-colonial and colonial society 
will in fact be confined to Java where PKI strength was con­
centrated and its political fate largely determined. The
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2agricultural activity occupied a role of dominance even more pro­
nounced than is the case today, all land in theory was under the 
sole disposition of the ruler. The farming population, however, 
had exclusive use of most of the productive land, either through 
periodic allocation by the village head acting on the basis of 
customary rules or through customarily acquired hereditary 
rights. The peasants’ use of the land was subject to the pay­
ment of taxes in kind to the ruler and his agents, and the per­
formance of labor and military services for them. The ruling 
groupe--the nobility and the prijaji or official class--were 
urban-dwelling for the most part and derived their incomes from 
a share of the taxation and services levied upon the peasants.
But these rights were not proprietary in' nature; they pertained 
to offices which themselves were not hereditary as a matter of 
course. The status and authority of the ruling groups, there­
fore, did not stem from the ownership of the means of production, 
but from the exercise, in the sovereign’s name, of politico- 
bureaucratic power over the population. In other words, the 
crucial social division between rulers and ruled was not one 
based on property, but on the positions each occupied in rela­
tion to the king. Needless to say, the sanction of coercion was 
available as required to buttress legitimacy. While, as Anderson 
points out,3 this system was not strictly patrimonial in the 
Weberian sense, it was much closer to that pole than to the 
’’feudal” system as it developed in Western Europe.
There were differences of landholding among the peasantry, 
based upon a division between those who were deemed, descendants 
of the village founders and those who derived from later immi­
grants. So far as can be determined, however, these distinctions 
were not of sufficient dimensions to produce marked inequalities 
of wealth or antagonisms of a class character. Village communal 
values with their strong egalitarian ethos, seem to have kept 
such distinctions within a narrow compass. Peasant antipathy 
was mainly directed towards the ruling groups, whose exactions 
on occasion were keenly felt, and found outlet in rebellions 
led by dissident nobles and officials, or messianic prophets 
generally animated by deviant religious beliefs. These ’’class" 
struggles, however, produced no stimulus towards basic social 
change; their aim was limited to local redress of grievances or 
the support of dynastic usurpers. Consequently, neither the 
social system nor the value system was significantly affected, 
and basic changes in the social structure came, when they did, 
as a result of exogenous pressures.
analysis is derived from the writings of Schrieke, Van Leur, 
Geertz and Furnivall in the main.
3. Benedict R. O ’G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese 
Culture," to be included in a forthcoming book edited by 
Claire Holt tentatively entitled Culture and Politics in 
Indonesia.
3Dutch colonial occupation, particularly in its later phases, 
substantially modified the Javanese social structure. The Dutch 
retained the traditional system of rulership over much of the 
island, but subjected the sovereigns to the will of their own 
administrative hierarchy. Early in the nineteenth century, the 
nobility and the prijaji were debarred from gaining their living 
directly from the peasantry, and were converted into salaried 
officials of the colonial administration. This measure could 
be carried out with minimal economic or social effects because 
the roTe of the indigenous ruling groups was not intimately 
bound up with the productive system. Any peasant antagonism 
towards the indigenous ruling strata was now concentrated upon 
their role as political agents carrying out exactions on behalf 
of and parasitic upon the foreign occupier. Thus the social 
basis was laid upon which the contradictions between the peas­
antry and their traditional rulers would find their principal 
ideological expression in nationalism rather than class antago­
nism. Additionally, the inhibition against entrepreneurial 
orientations implicit in the social role and value system of 
the indigenous ruling strata was strengthened by the premium 
placed on administrative status under the colonial system.
The impact of a more developed economic system upon the 
traditional society initiated greater variety and complexity in 
the Javanese rural structure in some areas, and particularly in 
West Java. Here social differentiation increased, and a class 
of landlords emerged, but, while the available data is sparse 
and often contradictory, their numbers are usually accepted as 
having been small and the average size of their holdings modest, 
at least until the last few decades. * In much of the island, 
however, what has been termed agricultural involution was the 
outcome— an economic and social "retrogression” characterized 
by the "shared poverty" system described and analyzed by Geertz.4 5 
In these villages, social differentiation and the development 
of class cleavages were inhibited.
The ranks of the landless laborers vastly swelled as the 
population grew. Some of them were absorbed into the foreign
4. See Karl Pelzer, "The Agricultural Foundation," in Ruth T. 
McVey (ed.), Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1 9 6 3 ). Useful sum­
maries of the available data, with somewhat divergent inter­
pretations, are also to be found in: Donald Hindley, The 
Communist Party of Indonesia 1 9 5 1-1 9 6 3 : a Decade of the Aidit 
Leadership (Canberra: Australian National University, 1 9 6 1 ), 
pp. *4-5; and Justus M. Van der Kroef, The Communist Party of 
Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics (Vancouver: Uni­
versity of British Columbia, 1965), pp. 7-9.
5. Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of 
Ecological Change in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of 
California, 1 9 6 3 ) and other works.
4estates as permanent or seasonal laborers; others took their 
way to the burgeoning towns and cities; those who remained in 
the environs of the village were either employed as day laborers 
by landlords and richer peasants or engaged as share-croppers-- 
in any case, they were fitted somewhere into the shared poverty 
system, with its characteristic mechanisms of coping with in­
creasing population pressure by ever more labor-intensive use 
of the land.
Trading and manufacturing classes (mostly confined to small- 
scale activity). expanded, occupying a position intermediate 
between the Dutch companies and the mass of the Indonesian popu­
lation. Dutch policy directed this activity predominantly into 
the hands of the ethnic Chinese, however, hindering the develop­
ment of an indigenous bourgeoisie. Part of the activity of the 
small entrepreneur was channelled into money-lending in the 
villages, but the resulting relationship did not establish a 
class nexus between the quasi-capitalist and the peasant; to the 
extent that antagonisms were produced by money-lending opera­
tions, they sometimes took racial forms, and in addition no 
doubt gave rise to diffuse resentments in the villages against 
urbanites, "blood-suckers" and non-traditional ways. In many 
cases, however, the lender-borrower relationship was "tradition- 
alized," the creditor entering upon the role of paternalistic 
protector or patron of his client.6
The Dutch virtually monopolized large-scale manufacture, 
estate management, mining and overseas trade and finance. They 
also introduced and administered modern means of communication. 
This in turn produced a small proletarian class, the foreign 
identity of whose masters also overlaid incipient class feeling 
with nationalism.7 Around these enterprises and the new or ex­
panded urban complexes, there developed a wide network of petty 
artisanship, trade and services, upon which a large proportion 
of the urban population was dependent for fringe employment.
These latter represent no more than a semi-proletariat in 
Marxist categorization, notoriously difficult to organize and 
imbue with social or ideological discipline.
Finally, Dutch measures also called into being a modern- 
style intelligentsia, almost exclusively out of the families of 
the nobility and the prijaji. This social grouping, aroused by 
Western-style education to the opportunities that modern life- 
ways opened up, but denied under the colonial system sufficient 
outlet for their material expectations and status aspirations,
6. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 8. But cf. Karl Pelzer, "Agri­
cultural Foundation," p. 126.
7. In 1930, there were some 350,000 workers in industrial enter­
prises employing more than 10 employees. Douglas Paauw,
"From Colonial to Guided Economy," in McVey, Indonesia, pp. 
178-179.
5formed the elite core of the nationalist movement in the twenti­
eth century. The intelligentsia were by no means homogeneous 
in outlook, however, their inability to found a common vehicle 
for the national struggle largely reflecting the strength of 
ethnic, religious and cultural cleavages in the society at 
large. Notably, too, this "class" failed to elaborate any but 
the vaguest goals beyond the achievement of national independ­
ence, even its most "radical" elements resting content with an 
anti-colonialist, anti-capitalist "socialism," and deferring 
further consideration of social objectives until the attainment 
of independence.
The later period of Dutch rule, then, virtually created 
property-based class relationships and interests, and did so 
then only to a limited extent. In propounding his theory of 
revolutionary social transformation, Marx had implicitly con­
ceived of class cleavage as encompassing the whole or the greater 
part of the society, subsuming other lines of social division. 
This is surely the inference to be attached to that resounding 
phrase from the Communist Manifesto, "The history of all hitherto 
existing societies is the history of class struggle." He also 
stressed the hegemonic role of the ideology of the ruling class 
in any social system, and in particular the protracted character 
of the process by which the modern working class acquires class 
consciousness (that is, evolves from a "class-in-itself" to a 
"class-for-itself")— a process accompanied by many blind alleys 
of "false consciousness" before the exploited find the right 
road to their emancipation.8 From Marxian premises themselves, 
then, we would expect to find class cleavages at the time of 
Indonesian independence occupying a rather low rating in com­
parison with other, older and more deeply-entrenched social 
divisions, a number of which, for various reasons, were intensi­
fied in the late colonial and early independence years.
So far as the workers and peasants are concerned, the 
available evidence tends to confirm this expectation. Union 
organization among the industrial and estate workers began as 
early as 1908, but did not become a significant force until 
taken in hand and developed by nationalist groups, including the 
Marxists, in the latter part of the next decade. The "brittle" 
character of union organization, and the tendency of its leaders 
and followers to oscillate between messianic enthusiasm and 
passivity, provided one indication of the rudimentary level of 
class consciousness prior to independence. Another was the 
failure of the working class to throw up leaders from among its 
own ranks, and its reliance instead for guidance upon the urban 
intelligentsia, whose concerns were related more to nationalist
8. See, for example, Bottomore 8 Rubel, Karl Marx: Selected
Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (London: Penguin, 
1965), pp. 93-95,"191-194.
6and party goals than to class demands as such.9 The village 
laborer and the poor peasant, needless to say, were still fur­
ther from freeing themselves from the traditional patronage 
relationships which provided their security and their prevailing 
frame of .social reference.
The PKI, after a brief period of efflorescence in the 
twenties, was effectively destroyed as an organization with mass 
connections following its abortive uprising against the Dutch 
in 1926, and did not re-emerge till after the outbreak of the 
national revolution in 1945. Then it quickly undertook the 
organization of the urban and estate workers, and, to a lesser 
extent, the village laborers and peasantry, mainly in the areas 
under Republican control. Union and peasant organizations with 
PKI influence appear to have been first in the field and to 
have gained a good deal of head start on the other political 
parties.10 This was not a time, however, for placing emphasis 
on class agitation. The PKI, largely made up of urban intelli­
gentsia and pemuda (alienated youth), was part of a national 
coalition facing a desperate struggle to realize common national 
aspirations, and the accent of the Party’s work therefore was 
upon moderation and cooperation with its revolutionary partners. 
In any case, only a small part of the industrial undertakings 
in the country were in Republican hands, and their operations 
were badly disrupted by the war. A significant change in party 
alignments and the character of political conflict in the Re­
publican camp took place in 1948 under the stress of cold war 
pressures affecting the nationalist struggle. Communist tactics 
changed accordingly, and the PKI moved towards a more militant 
oppositional posture. After the adoption of Musso’s New Road 
resolution in August, the PKI proceeded to tighten up its organ­
ization and to stimulate anti-governmental feeling among its 
followers. Its main reliance, however, was placed upon armed 
units whose grievances 'stemmed- from a. threatened demobilization.
In contrast to the direct approach which the PKI used in 
organizing the worker^, its access to the peasantry (such as it 
was) seems predominantly to have been via channels of patronage, 
kinship and traditional influence.11 Such an operational tech­
nique was not calculated to bring out latent class tensions in 
the countryside, but then it was doubtless dictated by the very
9. See Everett D. Hawkins, "Labor in Transition," in McVey, 
Indonesia, pp. 257-258, and, more generally, Ruth T. McVey, 
The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University, 19 6"Sy.
10. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University, 1962) , pp. 166-16 8 , 172-173 .
11. Ibid., pp. 169-171.
7weakness of class factors in the villages.12
The Madiun affair brought this phase of PKI activity to an 
end, and in itself revealed something about the level of class 
consciousness among the lower strata. Although the PKI had by 
now a substantial trade union organization attached to it, the 
working class in general did not come to the Party’s aid in its 
time of travail.13 Of equal significance, the conflict in the 
rural areas developed, not along class lines, but along the 
line of santri-abangan cleavages.14
In January 1951, the Aidit leadership group took over the 
shattered PKI and began to construct the elements of the strate­
gy it was to pursue over the next fourteen years. The difficul­
ties facing the young communist leaders were formidable. For 
the Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese and Yugoslav communists, war 
and national revolution had provided great opportunities for 
establishing their leadership of the forces of national salva­
tion. But in the Indonesian case, by contrast, the communists 
had profited only temporarily from these conditions, and had 
been all but destroyed in their contest with opposed political 
forces. Far from emerging from the independence struggle with 
strong nationalist credentials, they were if anything
12. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, pp. 177-179, refers to a BTI 
(Barisan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants Front) initia- 
tive in land sharing in the Gunung Kidul region of Central 
Java, but from his brief description of the incident it ap­
pears to have owed more to millenerian traditions than to 
class consciousness.
13. See George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indo­
nesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1962), p. 266; 
Hindley, Communist Party, p. 133. Cf. PKI Chairman Aidit:
!f, . . in the second half of 1948 the counter-revolution 
succeeded in misleading some Communist supporters, whose 
numbers were quite considerable at that time.” (World 
Marxist Review, Vol. II, No. 7 (July 1959))
14. See Robert Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java 
(New Haven: Yale University, 1963), pp. 96-97. Santri- 
abangan (lit. white-red) schism which rends the ethnic Java­
nese has its origins in the uneven impact of Islam on Java, 
as a result of which a minority of Javanese think of their 
religion as their main point of cultural reference, while 
the majority, although nominally Moslem, derive their values 
and religious practices from the traditions of pre-Islamic 
Javanese culture. The lifeways of each are often intensely 
repugnant to the other, despite the fact that the traditions 
are in fact intermingled among both. Generally on this sub­
ject, see Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe, 
Illinois: Free Press, 1960)  ^ esp. pp. 121-130. Generally the ’’more Islamic" or santri tended to be anti-PKI.
8suspect on this issue. In their comeback, they had to contend 
with power groups which themselves enjoyed the prestige and 
legitimacy deriving from their leading role in the national 
struggle, and in addition now disposed of significant govern­
mental and power resources.
Social unrest and dissatisfaction certainly existed as a 
possible base for gathering support: the revolution had unset­
tled the pemuda generation especially, stirring in them diffuse 
resentments, undermining the hold of traditional repositories 
of authority, and arousing high expectations for the era that 
was to follow upon independence. The governmental elite was 
neither able to satisfy their expectations nor provide them with 
an integrative frame for their restless energies. This discon- 
tended mass was strongly susceptible to ideological appeals, 
but the conditions for converting their disenchantment into 
class outlook and action were anything but favorable.
As the PKI leaders read the situation, a strategy of armed 
agrarian revolution was ruled out by Party weakness and divi­
sion, its lack of extensive ties with the peasantry, and the 
nature of rural schisms. Where was the Party to find a suffi­
ciently powerful appeal that would alienate the peasantry from 
the ruling groups? How could it fend off the attacks of the 
army in overcrowded Java with its good system of roads, where 
the overwhelming bulk of its support was concentrated? Where 
would it set up rural bases, when the few areas suitable for 
such emplacements were mostly santri strongholds? Where would 
it find sanctuary, or a ready source of outside aid? Some Party 
cadres apparently favored abandoning the cities in favor of pre­
parations for peasant armed struggle;15 but, although there were 
some areas where they may have found a following among squatters 
on government lands and estate workers, the long-term potential 
of such a strategy was hardly encouraging to a Party that had 
only recently been dealt a shattering blow by military and 
religio-cultural forces.
The prospects for oppositional activity based on the work­
ers in the cities and towns were no more enticing. The Sukiman 
Government responded to a wave of union militancy in 1950-51 
with a punishing series of raids on PKI and union cadres in 
August 1951, as a result of which the Party was politically iso­
lated and its organizational efforts set back for one to two 
years.16 The workers at this time showed little preparedness to
15. See Aidit!s "Report to the Fifth Congress of the PKI (1954)," 
Problems of the Indonesian Revolution (Bandung: Demos, 1963), 
p. 254.
16. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy 
in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1962), pp. 
187-191”
9defend their arrested leaders,17 18 In view of the small size of 
the proletariat, its undeveloped state of class and political 
consciousness, and its vulnerability to governmental and army 
repression, the PKI leaders decided that the Party needed a top 
political alliance for the purposes of protection, even at the 
price of modifying drastically its reliance on class issues as 
a means of attracting support and exerting pressure in the 
political arena.
The decision was undoubtedly made easier for the PKI lead­
ers by reason of their own radical nationalist orientation, ac­
quired as pemuda leaders in the national revolution, but there 
was also a persuasive logic to it. On the one hand, the re­
sources for an anti-elite struggle were demonstrably weak. On 
the other hand, the nature of intra-elite struggle, and the 
cleavage factors which nourished it, offered the Party possi­
bilities of achieving the protection and opportunities for ex­
pansion it required. No doubt the leaders estimated at the time 
that, once the PKITs initial weakness was overcome, they would 
be able to revitalize the class struggle.
In the absence of strong class pressures, political parties 
and mass- organizations organized their followings largely along 
lines of religious and cultural cleavage. The major elite 
groupings aggregated these cleavage bases, but intra-elite con­
flict also owed a good deal to differences in political values 
and styles, and to the divergent socio-economic interests which 
they encompassed.x8 The latter were a very important source of 
conflict, particularly between the Masjumi, with its clientele 
of santri businessmen and Outer Islands export producers, and 
the PNI, with its base among the Javanese civil bureaucracy and 
the patronage it extended to a group of predominantly Javanese 
importers. Governmental and parliamentary disagreement ov$r 
exchange rate policy and the role of foreign capital in the 
economy during the fifties expressed this divergence of inter­
ests. However, two aspects of this interest conflict need to 
be noted. In the first place, it ran parallel to, rather than 
cutting across, alivan (ideological and cultural streams) 
schisms, and thus became enmeshed with the value contestation 
at the ideological level. In the second place, the nature of 
the interest conflict was such that it served PKI purposes only 
within the context of the kind of nationalist alliance it was 
pursuing, and not in a class struggle context.
Hence, there was nothing "artificial” about the prominence 
of primordial issues in the political struggle, in the sense 
that they were merely whipped up by the elite factions as a
17. Hindley, Communist Party, p. 134.
18. These differences are discussed by Feith, Decline of Consti- 
tutional Democracy, pp. 129-1^3.
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means of social control. There was no homogeneity among the 
elite to support such an interpretation, and the issues them­
selves not only had long historical antecedents, but were aggra­
vated as a result of the traumatic social disruption caused by 
war and revolution.19
While groups among the political elite did manipulate 
social unrest for purposes of social control and their own ad­
vantage, they did so as actors whose values were themselves 
tied in with those of larger publics. While it is arguable 
that" too low a rating has often been accorded to economic inter­
est as a. factor in the struggle among competing elite factions, 
no nsingle factor” theory of political conflict will suffice to 
interpret the complex and clouded history of the period.
The political process may be studied substantially in terms 
of elite group contest because, social unrest notwithstanding, 
the terms within which these groups set political conflict, and 
the control they exercised over its manifestations, were not 
challenged to any significant degree. The major exception--the 
Darul Islam rebellion (the extraordinary tenacity of which can­
not be explained without reference to class-based differences)
— nevertheless arose out of the same pattern of primordial and 
value conflicts which was expressed through the elite divisions. 
The PKI formed another exception, but only a partial one. On 
the one hand, the Party’s mobilization of the workers and peas­
ants potentially challenged the elite-centered nature of the 
political struggle, and its ultimate aims, in Lev’s words, 
"threatened the entire social and political order.”20 But, on 
the other hand, neither the PKI leaders nor their followers 
were immune to the issues which sundered the elite formations. 
Specifically, the more that the Sukarnoists expressed their 
ambitions in radical nationalist slogans emphasizing ’’national 
unity” and ’’the uncompleted revolution,” the more they plucked 
at sentiments shared by the pemuda generation which provided 
the leadership and cadre core of the Communist Party. The PKI 
leaders could not have swum against this stream, even if they 
had wanted to, since there existed no alternative basis upon 
which their movement could have gained headway against govern­
mental and military hostility. As a result, in return for pro­
tection and a measure of freedom at the grassroots level, the
19. For a discussion of the factors involved in the frequent 
phenomenon of primordial ’’backlash” after independence in 
the third world, see Clifford Geertz, ’’The Integrative Revo­
lution - Primordial Loyalties and Civil Politics in the New 
States,” in Geertz (ed.), Old Societies and New States 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1963).
20. Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indone­
sian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indo­
nesia Project, 1964), p. 171.
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PKI was obliged to moderate its class appeals and underwrite the 
Revolutionary" legitimacy and power claims of the Sukarnoists. 
PKI intervention in the political struggle thus tended to rein­
force rather than transform the character of the elite-dominated 
contest•
These considerations set problems for any view which sees 
as the central issue in post-independence politics a threat to 
the elite posed by the social unrest which the PKI in part ex­
pressed.21 2 This unrest would only have posed a distinct threat 
to the elite if the dissatisfied (or a substantial portion of 
their number) had apprehended social circumstances and their 
own interests in terms significantly different from those in 
which intra-elite conflict was couched. Not only was this not 
the case, but neither the PKI nor any other prospective counter­
elite saw the possibility of gaining advantage by attempting to 
organize social unrest in ways which cut right across the intra­
elite pattern of conflict.
In particular, such a view must resolve the question of 
why significant sections of the elite were prepared to ally 
themselves with the PKI against other competitors and, after 
these competitors were eliminated from immediate power consider­
ations, continued to sponsor the Party under Guided Democracy. 
Was it because these groups were convinced that they had the 
PKI leaders "tamed"? Or was it rather that they were confident 
that the PKI could not use its following to threaten the elite’s 
position? Or again, were these groups themselves torn between 
the desire to assure their own dominance, and their attraction 
to the dynamic vigor of the PKI and the possibilities for 
national resurgence offered by communist prescriptions? Once 
again, the problems hardly seem reducible to a single explana­
tory factor, any more than the elite can be regarded as homo­
geneous .2 2
The three main elements in the PKIrs strategy were: 1) The
cultivation of the closest possible relations with the dominant 
anti-Islamic nationalist groups (in particular, the PNI and 
President Sukarno). The original object of this alliance was 
primarily protection. Later, as other avenues of obtaining
21. This view is advanced by David Levine, "History and Social 
Structure in the Study of Contemporary Indonesia," Indonesia, 
No. 7 (April 1969).
22. The disposition to regard problems of revolutionary change
as explicable in terms of one central knot of "contradiction" 
which, once it is untied, will unravel all the other knots 
in the social structure, particularly belongs to the Leninist 
and Maoist variants of Marxism. The success of their revo­
lutionary strategies in their own countries does not oblige 
us to accept the universal validity of their theorem.
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power were cut off, the Party came to view it as holding the 
prospect of bringing it a share in governmental power under the 
Nasakom formula, from which it could, with the backing of mass 
pressure, enlarge its position in the political structures and 
eventually achieve hegemony either by invitation of, or a short 
sharp struggle with, its partners. 2) The accumulation of the 
largest possible membership and organized support. In part, 
this massive following was to be used as a "bluff” in order to 
enhance the PartyTs value as an ally and to ward off threats to 
it; additionally, it became an instrument for keeping the momen­
tum of nationalism alive in tune with SukarnoTs preoccupations.
So long as the parliamentary system subsisted, the large mass 
following was highly relevant to PKI power concerns, but it is 
doubtful that the PKI leaders seriously expected to be allowed 
to obtain power through the ballot-box. In terms of the strat­
egy, the size of the following was more important than its qual­
ity or "proletarian” composition, although of course these were 
also sought as far as was compatible with the more basic con­
siderations. 3) According ideological primacy to symbols asso­
ciated with nationalism and national unity. Concentration on 
these issues enabled the PKI to appeal tothe widest common 
denominator of mass support and elite sentiment, and it tended 
to structure situations in such a way as to strengthen the posi­
tion of all "radical" anti-Western groups as against their oppo­
nents .
The strategy was presented as a class alliance, uniting the 
working class, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the 
national bourgeoisie against their common enemies, imperialism 
and its domestic agents, the compradore bourgeoisie, and feudal­
ism. In reality, however, it was essentially a political alli­
ance between the radical nationalists among the elite and the 
communists. Increasingly, PKI formulations began to recognize 
this fact more obviously, abandoning class concepts in favor of 
terminologies reflecting the politics of accommodation. The 
general trend may be represented by the following modes in which 
the PKI presented its political analyses:
The identification of the Party’s political allies and oppo­
nents with incongruent social formations. The PNI, for all its 
bureaucratic, anti-entrepreneurial orientation, was treated as 
virtually equivalent to the "national bourgeoisie," while the 
Masjumi, which approached as closely as was possible in Indone­
sian conditions to a party of the "national bourgeoisie," was 
bracketed together with the PSI as "the compradore bourgeoi- 23
23. Usually the attribution was implicit in the way the PKI de­
scribed the respective "class" forces. But occasionally it 
was more explicit, as when Lukman referred to the PNI as 
"the main representative of the national bourgeoisie."
World Marxist Review, Vol. II, No. 8 (August 1959).
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The adoption, in preference to class categories, of the 
Maoist formula of ,Tleft, right and middle forces,” the infinite 
flexibility of which arises from the fact that each constituent 
element in the formula is itself capable of being divided in 
turn into ”left, right and middle forces,” and so on.21*
The acceptance of the three aliran of Nasakom as the sub­
stantial foundation of the ”united national front.”25
The posing of the political struggle in terms of a conflict 
between a united people of all social strata, and foreign or 
foreign-dominated elements.26
Class analysis did not disappear altogether, and in specific 
conditions (such as the land reform campaign of 1964-65) it re­
gained some prominence. The overall tendency, however, was to 
jettison it or to attach class labels to non-class concepts. 
Likewise, while the Party used class appeals to some extent in 
mobilizing support, its massive following was mainly built up 
along other lines--identification of the Party with the cause 
of national unity and national revolution; association with 
prestigious organizations and individuals; welfare activities 
of various kind,s; identification with "modernism”; the use of 
patronage relationships, especially in the villages; propagation 
of the achievements of the communist states; the attraction of 
a "total” philosophy; the prestige of a party free of corruption 
and demoralization, and knowing where it was going, etc.
Implicit in much of the PKI! s appeal was the conformity of 
its notions to traditional Javanese concepts and values. As 
Anderson has pointed out, for example, the projection of poli­
tics in terms of rakjat versus "alien,” which infused the com­
munist approach to the ongoing nationalist crusade, possessed 
pronounced resonance in a society where "the urge to one-ness”
24. See Aiditfs "Report to the PKI Sixth Congress (1959),” 
Problems, pp. 314-317. Cf. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works 
(London: Lawrence 6 Wishart, 1954), Vol. Ill, pp. 194-203.
25. Lukman, Tentang Front Persatuan Nasional (Djakarta: Jajasan
Pembaruan, 1962), pp. 34-35; Aidit, "Untuk Pelaksanaan Jang 
Lebih Konsekwen dari Manifesto Politik,” Bintang Merah, 
July-August, 1960, p. 308; Aidit, Revolusi Indonesia, 
Latarbelakang Sedjarah dan Haridepannja (Djakarta: Jajasan 
Fembaruan, 1964), p . 72. * *L“~
26. Aidit: "The form of the class struggle in Indonesia at the
present time . . .  is a struggle of all the Indonesian 
people who are revolutionary against imperialism (monopoly 
capitalism) and feudal remnants." Harian Rakjat, August 20, 
1964.
is central to political attitudes.27 The abangan of central 
and east Java adopted the PKI as a vehicle for their interests, 
'consequently deepening the rift which lies at the root of 
Javanese society by giving religious and cultural divisions a 
politico-ideological dimension.
Persistent attempts were made by PKI leaders, especially 
in later years, to convert the basis of Party allegiance to one 
of class by means of ideological education programs, but the 
effort encountered great obstacles in the multi-class nature of 
the Party’s composition, the influence of traditional categories 
of thought, the persistence of outlooks conditioned by non-class 
cleavages, the Party’s own strategy de-emphasizing class, and 
(it would seem) a disposition on the part of its following to 
show little inclination for prolonged study unconnected with 
perceived achievement prospects. Generally, it may be suggested 
that, in the absence of pronounced experiential factors promoting 
a shift in value-orientations, the imparting of new ideas usually 
results in the selective incorporation of those ideas into the 
prevailing value structure, rather than to the transformation 
of the structure itself.
The PKI’s strategy brought it substantial gains in the 
fifties, in that its numbers and support grew prodigiously, the 
Masjumi and PSI were widely discredited and ousted from formal 
power positions, the most radically anti-communist officers were 
cashiered for their part in the regional rebellion, the Party 
won wide respect for its nationalist fervor, and the President 
bestowed upon it his patronage and protection.
The line pursued by the PKI leadership aroused spme opposi­
tion and misgivings within the Party’s ranks, but the fact that 
there took place no significant breakaway inside the Party or 
among its following, is confirmatory of the view that social 
unrest was not to any important extent ideologically demarcated 
from the cleavage issues which formed the basis of elite con- 
flict.2 8
The PKI's advance along the parliamentary road was rudely 
cut short when, in 1957, Sukarno teamed up with the army to re­
place the constitutional structure by a more authoritarian 
political system. To what extent was the transition to Guided 
Democracy a reaction on the part of the elite to the threat of
27. Anderson, "The Idea of Power."
28. Indications of some restlessness in the PKI with regard to
its political line were given from time to time by the 
Party's leaders. See B. 0. Hutapea's "Report to the Seventh 
Congress (1962)," Madju Terus! Dokumen-dokumen Kongres 
Nasional ke-VII (Luarbiasa) PKl (Djakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 
1963), pp. '2 8^-249.------------
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PKI domination of the parliamentary system? Here again, multi­
ple-factor analysis appears more capable of providing explana­
tions than a single focus. Defense of the constitutional system 
by the communistsT most determined foes among the political 
parties hardly seems consistent with the view that the PKI*s 
challenge was the single dominating factor m  the political 
crisis of the time. Alongside it, and perhaps overshadowing it, 
was the bitter conflict between the regional forces and their 
allies, on the one side, and the central government and its 
allies, on the other. (This presentation greatly oversimplifies 
a complex aggregation of cleavage bases on both sides, but it 
will have to suffice for our purpose.) Among the chief.propo­
nents of Guided Democracy, there were undoubtedly some who re­
garded the blocking of PKI progress as a major calculation; 
others, including President Sukarno, can I think be considered 
as viewing the problem more in terms of a threat arising from a 
number of directions to the integrity of the nation under their 
leadership.
The destruction of the parliamentary and party system, 
which was serving it so well, came as a heavy blow to the PKI.
Once again, however, the relation of forces appeared to the 
leaders to leave them no alternative but to accept the new dis­
pensation. To have resisted the changes would have left the 
Party isolated and acutely vulnerable, sandwiched between the 
bitterly anti-communist regional forces on one side and the 
President-army combination on the other.
Could the PKI have distanced itself from the Guided Democ­
racy developments, refusing to go along with the changes but 
not actively resisting them, and counting on a combination of 
governmental ineptitude and economic decline to bring about 
eventually a pattern of conflict that would enable it to over­
throw the regime? Assuming that such a posture did not provoke 
immediate and drastic repression, the very least the Party would 
have had to contend with would have been the loss of a great 
part of its popular support, the takeover of its mass organiza­
tions by army and/or Presidentially-sponsored fronts, and a sub­
stantial growth in military power. It is difficult to see that 
its prospects of success in these circumstances would have been 
any brighter than they were a few years earlier.
There is little to suggest that the workers and peasants 
of Java reacted to the changes from a class viewpoint, or could 
have been persuaded to do so. To judge by their public responses, 
they were swayed in their appreciation of the issues by the 
charismatic and traditional appeals of the President, and gener­
ally aligned themselves in accordance with aliran cleavages as 
modified by the political leaderships.
With evident reluctance, but outward enthusiasm, the PKI 
leaders chose to embrace Guided Democracy, heartened by the 
promise of Presidential protection, the persistence of conflict
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between army and President, and the decline in the power of 
their party competitors. With the introduction of Guided Democ­
racy, there took place a neo-traditionalist revival on the 
political plane, with the ruling cliques of prijaji origin re­
verting more openly to the ceremonial styles and patterns of 
status politics of old Java, and waging a contest for court 
favor and perquisites very much as their forebears had done. 
Politico-bureaucratic roles again became more exclusively the 
hallmarks of prestige. At the same time, class did move up 
somewhat on the ladder of social cleavage. The concentration 
of major industrial and commercial functions in the hands of 
state officials after 1957, and the tendency for economic under­
takings to be viewed as the appanages of those to whom their 
management was entrusted, now created the potential for direct 
conflict of interest between the workers and the "bureaucratic 
capitalists," as the PKI dubbed the new administrators.
In the countryside, too, an important change was effected 
as a result of the passage in 1960 of the land laws and commu­
nist efforts to get the government to implement them. By 
proposing the transfer to landless peasants of land in excess 
of certain sizes, and setting limits upon the amount of the crop 
payable to landowners under sharing agreements, these laws laid 
the ground for a struggle between the interests of the rural 
dispossessed and the wealthier village strata.
The PKITs experience was to demonstrate, however, that 
class was still too slender a reed to support a major bid to 
change the political balance of forces. The position of the in­
dustrial workers (only about 60 per cent of whom were enrolled 
in PKI-led unions) was still one of acute weakness in the face 
of a hostile army officer corps now having a direct interest 
(via the nationalized enterprises) in industrial peace and but­
tressed by martial law powers. A large part of the industrial 
labor force was still semi-rural in character, and a high pro­
portion consisted of female workers.29 In addition, workers in 
state enterprises were dependent to a considerable degree upon 
government allocations of food, while in private undertakings 
there often existed strong "paternalistic" relations between 
employer and employee. In conditions of accelerating economic 
crisis and declining production, the falling living standards 
of the workers, rather than promoting militancy, strengthened 
their long-standing preference for security.30
29. Everett D. Hawkins, "Labor in Transition," Hindley, Communist 
Party, esp. pp. 154-156, Lance Castles, Religion, Politics 
and Economic Behaviour in Java; The.Kudus Cigarette Industry 
(New Haven: Yale University, 1967).
30. Castles, Religion, Politics and Economic Behaviour, esp.
p p . 7 5 - 8 4 .
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The PKI appeared for a time in 1959-60 to be moving towards 
a more uncompromising anti-government stance involving the pro­
motion of union industrial action. In this period, its attacks 
upon the government were the most intransigent that had been ex­
pressed since the early fifties and distinct rumblings were 
heard from the leftwing labor federation SOBSI. The aim appears 
to have been to force the PartyTs admission to the Cabinet, but 
the army clampdown on the Party following its July 8, 1960 cri­
tique of the government, put a stop to this militant shift and 
convinced the PKI leaders that "class interests must be subordi­
nated to national interests."31 Neither the consciousness of 
the Partyfs following, nor the mood of the workers, nor the 
general political climate and balance of strengths, was conducive 
to an offensive in the cities. Although primordial cleavages 
were initially dampened down somewhat by the blow struck at 
regional and santri interests, the intense nationalist symbolism 
of the regime obscured and discouraged the expression of class 
interests from below. In addition, official "retooling" cam­
paigns and pseudo-radical slogans held out to the workers phan­
tom promises of the remedying of their grievances.
After its early disenchantment with militant oppositional 
tactics in 1959-60, the Party adopted a new variant of its 
established strategy. Using nationalism as its major vehicle 
for mobilizing the masses and cementing political alliances, it 
sought to impress the President and his entourage with its in­
dispensability in attaining their ends, and so to gain entry to 
the key power structures. Although by September 1965 the PKI 
had not succeeded in its prime objective of seizing major levers 
of bureaucratic power, it nevertheless had proved its versatility 
and resourcefulness in overcoming many of the disabilities from 
which it suffered in the early years of Guided Democracy and 
placing itself in the center of future power considerations.
The PartyTs leaders by this time enjoyed very close personal 
relations with the President, to the point of arousing great 
envy among their rivals. It built up an enormous mass follow­
ing, gained preponderant influence in the official mass vehicle 
of the regime (the National Front), extended its organization 
on a national basis, and won widespread recognition of its 
patriotism and political capacity. From 1963 onwards, it was 
able to have "rightists" removed from many power positions, 
though not to destroy the structures which sustained and sup­
ported them (the army, the bureaucracy, NU, Moslem mass organi­
zations, informal political cliques, etc.). The President was 
pursuing an increasingly leftward course, culminating in the 
formation of an "international front" with China and sharp breaks 
with Western powers headed by the United States.
Meanwhile the PKI had not altogether abandoned its quest 
for a militant base of support that it could use as an aid in
31. Aidit, "Madju Terus Menggempur Imperialisme dan Feodalisme," 
Harian Rakjat, January 2, 1961.
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persuading the elite to acknowledge its claims to a more deci­
sive role in the regime. Already by 1959, this quest had begun 
to shift towards the countryside, where the weight of army power 
was less pronounced. The Party spent the next four years trying 
to strengthen the class character of its rural organizations and 
preparing the peasants to stand up for their rights under the 
land laws. By late 1963, it judged the time ripe for a class 
offensive in the villages, the first decisive turn to a struggle 
hinged on class cleavages. The result was the aksi sefihak 
(unilateral action) campaign of 1964-65. This was a sustained 
PKI attempt to mobilize the poor peasants and share-croppers to 
assert their rights under the land reform laws of 1960, the im­
plementation of which had bogged down under the weight of bureau­
cratic inertia and the resistance of interested persons and 
groups. The "actions" ranged from holding a deputation, pre­
senting a petition, or staging a demonstration, to the unilateral 
seizure of land by force and the refusal to pay the landowner 
more than a certain percentage of the crop.
A thorough study of the aksi sefihak campaign remains to be 
undertaken, and many aspects of it (including the extent to 
which the PKI leadership was proceeding on the basis of its own 
appreciation of political conditions, or was responding to pres­
sures from its rural cadres) are still obscure, but I would 
hazard the following tentative conclusions about it:
The PKI succeeded in developing a sufficient degree of 
class solidarity among the village poor, predominantly those of 
abangan persuasion, to support a fairly extensive campaign on 
Java, Bali, and, to a lesser extent, parts of Sumatra.
Bitter opposition arose to the aksi sefihak and the PKI 
among landowners and their clients. The opposition was stimu­
lated and encouraged by kijaji (village holy men), Moslem organ­
izations and many PNI local leaders. The religious sentiment 
of the santri was deliberately and effectively aroused against 
the "godless" who were threatening the lands of the pesantren 
(the Moslem religious schools, which in some cases did own quite 
a good deal of land, and in addition frequently served as 
"dummies" for Moslem landowners). Violent outbursts of Moslem 
resentment distorted the class character of the campaign and 
converted it in many areas into one of aliran discord.
Army and civilian authorities in local districts were gen­
erally on the side of the opponents of the aksi, either openly 
or tacitly. Traditions of village harmony and deference to 
authority also operated against the PKI.
Despite favorable intervention by the President, the anti- 
PKI forces appear to have gained the upper hand in the struggle; 
their long, pent-up passion and their solidarism, backed by local 
authority, made many peasants recoil from the discord which was 
fomented by the presentation of their demands.
19
By the PKI’s own accounts, its rural organizations were by 
no means wholly committed to the aksi or disciplined in carrying 
it out. In 1964, PKI leaders were still complaining that 
wealthy elements at the local level were obstructing Party deci­
sions.32 At the same time, critics of the PKI alleged that 
Moslem and *PNI antipathy to the aksi was intensified by the 
PKITs "hypocrisy" in protecting its own landlord patrons from 
the effects of the land laws.33
On the other hand, the Partyfs leaders became worried lest 
they had overplayed their hand. In May 1965, in the aftermath 
of the campaign, Aidit accused "some Party cadres" of having 
displayed impatience, adventurism and lack of concern for 
"national front" considerations.34
The extent and violence of the Moslem upsurge seems to have 
come as something of a surprise to the PKI leaders. Yet it had 
been building up for some time. Political events from 1957 on­
wards had represented a major defeat for Moslem parties, business 
interests and religious concerns. Resentments rankled, particu­
larly among the younger generation, who in reaction against the 
incapacity and compromising attitudes of their elders, developed 
a now-or-never spirit of uncompromising struggle against the 
communist advance, inspired by religious revivalism.35 Communist 
and nationalist attacks on the HMI, the Moslem student organiza­
tion, were one of a number of factors which led the Islamic 
youth to take to action in defense of their threatened interests, 
and the land reform issue, by adding to their insecurity, aroused 
them to violent attacks upon the PKI and allied organizations.
32. PKI leaders expressed these views to me in November 196*4.
See also Asmu's Report to the National Conference of the 
BTI in September 1964 , Suara Tani, No. 2, 1965 .
33. I am indebted to Dr. Ruth McVey and Professor E. Utrecht for 
discussions which have helped greatly to clarify my under­
standing of the aksi sefihak campaign. Neither of them, 
however, is responsible in any way for the interpretation 
presented here. See also W. F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before 
and After the Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXXIX,
Nos. 1 S 2 (Spring and Summer 1966), and "From Aliran 
Towards Class Struggle in the Countryside of Java" (Paper 
delivered at the International Conference on Asian History 
at Kuala Lumpur, August 1968); and (with special reference 
to Moslem reactions) Lance Castles, "Notes on the Islamic 
School at Gontor," Indonesia, No. 1 (April 1966).
34. See his report to the CC of the PKI, Harian Rakjat, May 
12-1*4 , 1965 .
35. See Lance Castles, Religion, Politics and Economic Behaviour, 
pp. 67-68.
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The PKI leaders, seeing feeling against them welling up in 
the PNI as well, and so placing their whole alliance strategy in 
jeopardy, were not altogether unhappy when a Presidentially-pro- 
moted compromise on the land issue was reached in December 1964. 
Thereafter, despite verbal offensives on land reform, the empha­
sis of the PKI ’ s work shifted back to welfare and cultural ques­
tions. The aksi sefihak had stimulated class awareness in the 
villages, but this had not reacted to the Party’s benefit; on 
the contrary, consciousness of their class interests had driven 
the landed elements in the Islamic parties and the PNI to mobil­
ize aliran sentiment against the communists to a point where it 
posed serious dangers for them.
By early 1965, politics had become sharply polarized between 
those who were prepared to cooperate with the PKI, even to the 
point of sharing power with it, and those who were determined to 
block the communists’ road. To many among the politically in­
fluential, there was a strong sense that ’’the revolution was 
moving ahead fast,” in other words, that the future lay with 
Sukarno as head of the leftwing camp; additionally, polarization 
had brought many non-communist nationalists into a position 
where they had more to fear from the PKI’s defeat than from its 
victory. Even among the PKI’s allies, however, there were not 
a few who had private reservations about supping with the tiger, 
especially since they were not unaware of the fact that their 
way of life differed considerably from the ideals underlying 
communist moral discipline and, to a lesser extent, from the 
actual life-styles of the PKI leaders. As the year wore on, 
uneasiness about Sukarno’s intentions and the country’s foreign 
policy drift, compounded by the rundown in the momentum of 
Malaysian confrontation and drastic economic decline, manifested 
especially in a marked acceleration in the rate of inflation, 
induced a profound crisis in the society. The President, how­
ever, still held the political balance and he avoided or delayed 
taking those steps--admission of the PKI to administrative power 
positions, creation of a fifth armed force— which were being 
urged upon him from the left and which may have tilted the 
scales one way or the other. As rumors of Sukarno’s ill-health 
gained currency, every faction began to look to their defenses; 
plot and counter-plot proliferated, and the soothsayers (tradi­
tional harbingers of dynastic collapse) were consulted with ever 
greater frequency. Time was running out on the PKI’s patient 
strategy, and a class-based alternative had proved unworkable.
The Party had hurdled most of the obstacles placed in the way 
of its climb to power, but it still had to contend with its 
longstanding enemies, the army generals, with their formidable 
machine of violence. The stage was thus set for the denouement 
of October 1, 1965.
